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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces social considerations into the calculation of the price index. To 
this purpose, recourse is made to the concept of distributional characteristic. It is shown 
how an aggregate price index can be expressed as a weighted average of commodity-
specific prices, with weights that depend on both the aggregate share of consumption 
and the way in which consumption is distributed across households. The proposed index 
provides a complementary basis for the analysis of the impact of inflation and for the 
calculation of its social value. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In its most general form, an aggregate price index (CPI) can be calculated as a weighted 
average of commodity-specific price indexes. To this purpose, the most common 
alternatives are democratic and plutocratic weights. In the first case, households’ budget 
shares – i.e. the share of each good in total household’s budget – are simply averaged 
across households; in the second case, households’ budget shares are weighted by the 
share of consumption of every household over aggregate consumption. This paper 
proposes an alternative and complementary way to aggregate elementary price indexes, 
with weights that depend on both the level of consumption and the way in which 
consumption is distributed across households. This aim is achieved by allowing social 
weights to enter the weighting structure and to let the aggregate price index to depend 
on the distributional characteristic of the good (see [1]; [2]; [3]). Unlike the 
alternative structures, the resulting aggregate price index will react more to the prices 
of those goods that are consumed mainly by the poor. The paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 deals with the definitions of the plutocratic and the democratic index. Section 
3 introduces social weights into the weighting structure and defines the corresponding 
aggregate price index. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Democratic and plutocratic weights 
 
Aggregate consumer price indexes (CPI) can be defined as a weighted average of 
commodity-specific price indexes. The literature identifies two main weighting 
structures, which give rise to either the democratic or the plutocratic CPI, and that 
differ with respect to how they aggregate households’ budget shares  across 
households (where  is household’s h consumption of good i and  is household’s h 
total consumption). 
The democratic method simply requires to average households’ budget shares. The 
commodity-specific weight is therefore given by: 
 
(1)     
 
where the superscript D stands for “democratic”, H is the total number of households 
and . Using this weighting structure, the corresponding CPI will be given by: 
 
(2)     
 
where  is the commodity-specific price index. Thus, in the democratic index, the price 
of each good is weighted by the average budget share of that good. 
With the plutocratic method, instead, each household budget share is weighted by 
the share of total household expenditures ( ) on aggregate expenditures X (where 
). In symbols: 
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(3)    
 
where the superscript P stands now for “plutocratic” and . Correspondingly, the 
aggregate plutocratic index will be given by: 
 
(4)      
 
Thus, the value of the aggregate CPI can vary according to the method used. This has 
originated a wide literature on the plutocratic gap (the difference ) and on 
its empirical measurement ([4]; [5]; [6]); to this regard, [5] and [6], for example, 
have derived a characterization of the CPI plutocratic gap in terms of dispersion of 
household’s expenditures and the sample covariance between the variation of budget 
shares and commodity-specific price indexes. 
 
 
 
3. The social value of the price index 
 
3.1. Social weights 
 
To the purpose of explaining the meaning of the proposed index, it is worth 
conveniently rewriting equation (3) as follows:  
 
(5)       
 
As it is clear from the numerator of equation (5), the aggregation of consumption of 
good i across households implicitly gives the same weight to every household. In other 
words, in the plutocratic weight, it is not relevant whether the same level of  is 
consumed by a poorer or by a richer household. This means that two goods j and k 
whose consumption is differently distributed across households, but that have the same 
share on total consumption ( ), count the same in the calculation of the 
plutocratic index. Our proposed index tries to remove this feature by introducing 
distributional weights in equation (5).1 In particular, consider a structure of household-
specific distributional weights , possibly derived by an individualistic social welfare 
function,2 with the only constraint that  (i.e. distributional 
weights are non-increasing with income). Then, define: 
                                                 
1 On the need of making explicit the value judgments on the income distribution involved in this kind of 
measurement, see also [6]. 
2 In particular, one can define 
  
€ 
W =W v1 y, p( ), ...vh y, p( ), ...vH y, p( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  as an individualistic social welfare 
function that depends on individuals’ indirect utility functions defined on income y and prices p. In this 
 4 
 
(6)      
 
where  stands for social weight. As one can see, the social weight is a modified version 
of the plutocratic weight in (5), the modification being the inclusion of household-
specific distributional weights that give more relevance to consumption of poorer 
households. For example, for a given level of , if ,  will count twice as 
much  in the calculation of the social weight. 
Now, recall the definition of the distributional characteristic given in [2], by which: 
 
(7)      
 
where is the average distributional weight. The distributional 
characteristic (DC) is a welfare-based indicator of how consumption is distributed across 
households. The higher the value of , the higher the concentration of consumption of 
good i among the poorest households. Note that if ,  (i.e. distributional 
weights are the same for all households), then , , which implies that the 
concept of distributional characteristic has a meaning only when consumption is 
differently weighted along the welfare ranking. Note also that the distributional 
characteristics are not necessarily correlated with households’ budget shares (see [3]). 
Intuitively, a good bought only by poor and not bought by non-poor may have a low 
budget share (if poor devote few resources to them) but a high distributional 
characteristic. 
From (7), we know that . Replacing this latter expression into (6) 
yields: 
 
(8)       
 
where it is clear that, analogously to the democratic and the plutocratic weighting 
structure, . By dividing the numerator and the denominator of the last term of 
equation (8) by X (i.e., total consumption), one can have: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
framework, the distributional weight is best interpreted as , i.e. as the social marginal utility 
of income. 
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(9)        
 
where . The interpretation of equation (9) is that when households are 
differently weighted along the income scale, the weights of commodity-specific price 
indexes will become a mixture of the aggregate share  and of the way in which 
consumption is distributed across households . Instead, when distributional weights 
are the same across households,  will collapse to , as , , and . 
Thus, the social weight  will be low either when the share of good i is low 
(consumption of the good is not very important in the society) or when the 
distributional characteristic is low (the good is marginally consumed by poor), which 
both seem desirable properties of a social index. For example, if two goods r and t have 
the same aggregate share of five per cent of total consumption, but r is mostly consumed 
by the poor and t is mostly consumed by the rich, it will be that , and thus  will 
count more than  in a social perspective.3 This implies that the social value of the price 
index of any commodity (or of a corresponding price change), other things being equal, 
will be higher when the poor spend a higher proportion of the total spending on that 
good (i.e., when  is greater) and not when expenditures on that good are a higher proportion 
of their own budget (see [3]). It follows from equation (9) that: 
 
(10)       
 
Expression (10) more clearly reveals that the social value of the price index of 
commodity i will be higher not only when expenditures on this commodity are a greater 
part of total spending ( ), but also when this commodity has a greater distributional 
characteristic ( ). 
At this stage, a simple example may help clarify the mechanics of the proposed index 
and the differences with the standard democratic and plutocratic CPI. For convenience, 
and without loss of generality, the example is built by considering price changes (i.e., 
inflation) rather than the price index.4 Table 1 is built considering two individuals (j and 
k) and two goods (A and B). Individual j, who is poorer, consumes a small fraction of A, 
which is 4.8 per cent of its budget, while it consumes the whole amount of good B, 
which is 95.2 per cent of its budget. Individual k, who is richer, spends 100 per cent of 
its budget on A. Table 1 reports the required variables to calculate the democratic and 
the plutocratic CPI. Assume that inflation on good A is 10 per cent and inflation on 
good B is 20 per cent. Now, the democratic CPI can be calculated by weighting 
                                                 
3 As a real-life example one can take the case of bread (B) in Egypt, whose price is very low (as it is 
government-subsidised) and is consumed exclusively by the poor. At the same time, the price of lamb (L) is 
higher, but richer households consume more of this good. As a consequence, if the share of bread in total 
consumption is lower than the share of lamb, , but ; the social value of the corresponding 
prices will be the combination of a size and of a distribution effect of the consumption of the two goods, as 
expected by a social index. 
4 However, CPI notation is here left to denote inflation. 
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commodity-specific inflation rates by the average budget share of each commodity (the 
democratic weight in table 1). This would yield 14.8 per cent. The plutocratic CPI, 
instead, weights commodity-specific inflation rates by  (the plutocratic weight in table 
1), which would yield 14.3 per cent. Note that the plutocratic CPI is lower as the good 
with the highest inflation (good B) is also the good with the lowest aggregate share 
(0.435<0.565 in the table). 
Consider now the parameters required to calculate . Column (6) introduces the 
distributional weights 0.6 and 0.3, under the simple assumption that j has twice as much 
distributional weight than k. The average distributional weight is 0.45. Note that 
weights can be of any magnitude, with the only constraint that . The 
distributional characteristic of good A is instead calculated as 0.692, while the same 
parameter for B is equal to 1.333. In this working example, , as greater absolute 
amounts of good B are consumed by the poor individual. Thus, from a social perspective, 
inflation on good B should deserve more attention than inflation on good A. By applying 
equation (9), social weights will be 0.403 for good A and 0.597 for good B.  
It is worth contrasting these values with the plutocratic weights. In this latter case, 
good A has a greater weight because its share on total consumption is greater. In the 
case of social weight, good A has still the greatest share on total consumption, but it is 
consumed more by the richest individual, which means that its distributional 
characteristic is lower. The combined weights reveal that good B is socially more 
relevant – aggregate consumption is lower but consumption is concentrated on poorer 
households. According to this line of reasoning, one can expect that since good B has 
also the highest inflation rate, the social price index should be higher than the 
plutocratic index. Indeed, the calculated social price index is 0.160, i.e., closer to the 
inflation rate of the good that is mostly consumed by the poorest individual. Thus, ceteris 
paribus,  reacts more to inflation rates that hit goods mainly consumed by poor (i.e. 
with a high distributional characteristic).5 
The differences among the various types of price index may be best picked if one 
considers the behaviour of all indexes with respect to a change of a single price index . 
In particular: 
 
(11a)      
(11b)      
(11c)      
 
Equation (11a) tells that the reaction of the democratic CPI to a change in the price of 
good i is measured by the average budget share. This means that  will increase 
more if inflation falls on goods that count more in the households’ budget, regardless of 
whether they count more in the budget of poorer or richer households.6 By equation 
                                                 
5 In the case where inflation were 0.2 on good A and 0.1 on good B (not reported in table), the plutocratic 
index would be 0.157, while the social index would be 0.140, the explanation being that in this case the 
highest inflation would have hit the good that is mostly consumed by the richest individual. As a 
consequence, the social value of inflation would be lower. 
6 For example, assume that the average budget share of bread is 20 per cent and bread counts more in the 
budget of poor households and also assume that the average budget share of luxury cars is 20 per cent and 
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(11b), instead, one can infer that  will increase more when the price change falls on 
goods that are a large part of the aggregate total spending. Finally, equation (11c) 
reveals that  is sensitive not only to the aggregate share of good i, but also to the 
way in which the consumption of this good is distributed across households. 
 
 
 
3.2. Household-specific price indexes 
 
Finally, it is worth reconciling the use of aggregation schemes reported in (2), (4) and 
(10) with the household-specific indexes. For each household, all methods imply: 
 
(12)      
 
However, the methods differ in how they aggregate expression (12) across households. 
The democratic method leads to , which gives the same result as 
equation (2); the plutocratic method leads to , which is equivalent 
to equation (4); the social method leads to , which is 
equivalent to equation (10). 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has proposed a social price index to complement the information embodied in 
the already available democratic and plutocratic indexes. This index is based on the 
concept of distributional characteristic and is obtained as a natural extension of the 
plutocratic index. In particular, in the social index, commodity-specific price indexes are 
weighted by a composite factor, given by the product of the aggregate share of good i 
( ) and of the way in which consumption is distributed across households ( ). As a 
consequence, the social price index collapses to the plutocratic index when all 
households are equally weighted along the income scale, i.e., when the distributional 
characteristics of the goods are all equal to one. This implies that the plutocratic index 
can be interpreted as a special case of a more general social index, the case being that of 
equal distributional weights for all households. We think that this index may have 
straightforward applications in the analysis of the impact of all price movements, 
including the assessment of the social value of indirect tax reforms. 
                                                                                                                                      
luxury cars counts more in the budget of richer households. According to (14a),  will react in the 
same way to the same increase of price of both bread and luxury cars. 
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Table 1 – A comparison between plutocratic, democratic and social weights 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaborations 
 
 
 
